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Abstract
Mathematical and computer models of epidemics have contributed to our understanding of the spread of infectious disease
and the measures needed to contain or mitigate them. To help prepare for future influenza seasonal epidemics or
pandemics, we developed a new stochastic model of the spread of influenza across a large population. Individuals in this
model have realistic social contact networks, and transmission and infections are based on the current state of knowledge
of the natural history of influenza. The model has been calibrated so that outcomes are consistent with the 1957/1958 Asian
A(H2N2) and 2009 pandemic A(H1N1) influenza viruses. We present examples of how this model can be used to study the
dynamics of influenza epidemics in the United States and simulate how to mitigate or delay them using pharmaceutical
interventions and social distancing measures. Computer simulation models play an essential role in informing public policy
and evaluating pandemic preparedness plans. We have made the source code of this model publicly available to encourage
its use and further development.
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Introduction
Mathematical and computer models of epidemics have
contributed to our understanding of the spread of infectious
disease and the measures needed to contain or mitigate them
[1–9]. Detailed computer simulations will play an important role
in evaluating containment and mitigation strategies for future
epidemics [8]. Although many simulation models have been
described in the literature, few are publicly available. Releasing the
source code of models would allow others to evaluate the quality of
the simulation, replicate results, and alter and improve the model.
We have released the source code for a new stochastic model of
influenza epidemics, FluTE. FluTE is an individual-based model
capable of simulating the spread of influenza across major
metropolitan areas or the continental United States. The model’s
structure is based on previously published work [3,6], but FluTE
incorporates a more sophisticated natural history of influenza,
more realistic intervention strategies, and can run on a personal
computer. Here, we describe the new model and illustrate how it
can be used to study the dynamics of an epidemic and to
investigate the population-level effects of interventions.
Model
FluTE is an individual-based simulation model of influenza
epidemics. In this section, we describe the model’s community
structure, natural history of influenza, and simulated interventions.
Briefly, all individuals in the model are members of social mixing
groups, within which influenza is transmitted by random mixing.
The model can simulate several intervention strategies, and these
can either change the transmission characteristics of influenza
(e.g., vaccination) or change the contact probabilities between
individuals (e.g., social distancing). Interventions can occur before
the epidemic or in response to an ongoing epidemic.
Community structure and social contacts
The simulation creates synthetic populations based on typical
American communities. The population is divided into census
tracts, and each tract is subdivided into communities of 500–3000
individuals based on earlier models [6,10]. Each community is
populated by randomly generated households of size 1–7 using the
US-wide family size distribution from the 2000 Census (Table 1).
The household is the closest social mixing group, within which
contacts between individuals occur most frequently and thus
influenza is transmitted most often. The population is organized as
a hierarchy of increasingly large but less intimate mixing groups,
from the household cluster (sets of four socially close households),
neighborhoods (1/4 of a community), and the community.
Although the model results are not sensitive to the exact size of
these groups, including such groups creates a realistic contact
network for disease transmission [11]. At night, everyone can
make contact with other individuals in their families, household
clusters, home neighborhoods, and home communities. In the
daytime, individuals might interact with additional groups. During
the day, most children attend school or a playgroup, where there is
a relatively high probability of transmission. Preschool-age
children usually belong to either a playgroup of four children or
a neighborhood preschool, which typically has 14 students. Each
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schools, one middle school, and one high school, which typically
have 79, 128, and 155 students, respectively.
Most working-age adults (about 72% of 19–64 year-olds) are
employed. Employment rates are determined on a tract-by-tract
basis using data from the US Census 2000’s Summary File 3, table
PCT35. Employed individuals often work outside of their home
communities. Each employed individual is assigned to work in a
destination census tract based on commuting data taken from Part
3 of the Census Transportation Planning Package (http://www.
fhwa.dot.gov/ctpp/dataprod.htm), which provides information on
the home and destination census tracts of workers in the United
States. We eliminated commutes over 100 miles from the data as
in [6] because many of these trips represent sporadic long-distance
travel rather than daily commutes. Working individuals are
assigned to communities and neighborhoods within their destina-
tion tracts to simulate casual community contacts during the day,
and a work group of about 20 people to represent their close
contacts at the workplace. Unemployed individuals remain in their
home communities and do not have close daytime contacts except
with members of their households who are not employed or
enrolled in school.
Individuals can engage in short-term, long-distance domestic
travel to represent vacations and other trips. Travel in our model is
based on the implementation in [6], which uses data from the
1995 American Travel Survey data available from the U. S.
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statis-
tics (http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_
statistics/). Each day, an individual has a fixed probability of
starting a trip based on an age-specific probability of traveling:
0.0023 for 0–4 year olds, 0.0023 for 5–18, 0.0050 for 19–29,
0.0053 for 30–64, and 0.0028 for 65 and older. The traveler will
stay at the destination for 0–11 nights, with 23.9% of trips lasting
for a single day (and no nights), 50.2% including 1–3 nights away,
18.5% including 4–7 nights away, and 7.4% for 8–11 nights. We
do not include differences in travel frequency or duration during
different times of the year (e.g., summer and holiday trips). The
destination is a randomly selected census tract, in which a random
community, neighborhood, and workplace (if the traveler is
between 19 and 64 years old) are assigned to be the traveler’s
mixing groups. A random member of this community is assigned
to be the traveler’s contact person, and at night the traveler will
behave as if he/she belongs to the contact’s household, household
cluster, and neighborhood. The traveler may withdraw to this
household if ill. The exact implementation of short-term, long-
distance travel is not important, but some long-distance travel is
required in large populations for the epidemic to spread in a
realistic manner. For simulations of smaller regions, such as a
single county, there is no need to include long-distance travel.
New infected individuals are introduced to a simulation by
infecting randomly selected people. This epidemic seeding process
can occur once at the beginning of a simulation or daily. In
addition, one can simulate an epidemic that is seeded from
international travelers. In this scenario, randomly selected
individuals in the counties with one of the United States’ 15
busiest international airports are infected each day, proportional to
the daily traffic of these airports (see Table 2).
Influenza natural history and transmission
The current modeling of the natural history of influenza is as
follows: An individual is infectious for six days starting the day
after becoming infected. The individual’s infectiousness is
proportional to the log of the daily viral titers taken from a
randomly chosen one of the six experimentally infected patients
described in [12,13] (Figure 1). An individual is asymptomatic
during the incubation period, which lasts from one, two, or three
days (with 30%, 50%, and 20% probabilities, respectively). After
incubation, the individual has a 67% chance of becoming
symptomatic [14,15]. Symptomatic individuals are twice as
infectious as asymptomatic people and may withdraw to the
home after 0 to 2 days [16] (with probabilities summarized in
Table 3). People who withdraw interact only with their
households. Six days after infection, an individual recovers and
is no longer susceptible.
Table 1. Frequency of household sizes.
Frequency Family size
33% single adult
34% two people (two adults or a parent and child)
13% two adults, one child
10% two adults, two children
7% two adults, three children
2% two adults, four children
1% two adults, five children
Data from [6].
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000656.t001
Table 2. International traffic to the 15 US airports built into
FluTE.
Airport City Passengers/year
JFK New York, NY 21,842,544
LAX Los Angeles, CA 17,019,166
MIA Miami, FL 15,509,279
ORD Chicago, IL 11375367
EWR Newark, NJ 10,812,993
ATL Atlanta, GA 9,166,055
SFO San Francisco, CA 8,648,219
IAH Houston, TX 7,627,942
IAD Washington, DC 5,893,142
DFW Dallas/Ft. Worth, TX 4,872,207
DTW Detroit, MI 3,887,481
PHL Philadelphia, PA 3,734,127
BOS Boston, MA 3,673,748
FLL Fort Lauderdale, FL 3,062,384
SEA Seattle, WA 2,766,576
Data from [45].
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000656.t002
Author Summary
Computer simulations can provide valuable information to
communities preparing for epidemics. These simulations
can be used to investigate the effectiveness of various
intervention strategies in reducing or delaying the peak of
an epidemic. We have made a detailed influenza epidemic
simulator for the United States publicly available so that
others may use the software to inform public policy or
adapt it to suit their needs.
Influenza Epidemic Simulation
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simulated day to represent daytime and nighttime social
interactions. The contact probability of two individuals in the
same mixing group is the probability that they will have sufficient
contact for transmission during a time step. Contact probabilities
of individuals within families were tuned so that the simulated
household secondary attack rates match estimates from [17]
(Table 4). Contact probabilities within other mixing groups were
tuned so that the final age-specific illness attack rates were similar
to past influenza pandemics (Table 5), particularly Asian A (H2N2)
and 2009 novel influenza A(H1N1) influenza, and the percentage
of transmissions that can be attributed to each mixing group
matched those in [6,18–20], although these values depend on the
transmissibility (R0) of the disease (Table 6). These contact
probabilities are in general agreement with other simulation
models [8] and with a recent study of physical contacts between
individuals [21]. Contact probabilities for all types of mixing
groups are summarized in Table 7.
Transmission probabilities in the simulation are adjusted by
multiplying all contact probabilities by a scalar, Ptrans, to obtain
the desired R0, the basic reproductive number, which is defined as
the average number of secondary infections from a typical infected
individual in a fully susceptible population [22]. To derive the
relationship between R0 and Ptrans, we infected a single
randomly selected person in an otherwise fully susceptible 2000-
person community with a 74% working-age adult employment
rate and counted the number of individuals that person infected,
repeating this procedure 1,000 times for several values of Ptrans.
The relationship between Ptrans the average number of
secondary cases was approximately linear for a biologically
plausible range of values: 4:768Ptransz0:040 (Figure 2). How-
ever, the average number of secondary cases was higher when the
index case was a child because children tend to infect more
individuals (and become infected more often) than adults.
Therefore, in a procedure borrowed from [6], we measured the
age distribution of secondary cases when the index case was
randomly selected and used this distribution to weight the
contribution from the various age groups to the R0 calculation
to define R0~5:592Ptransz0:068. The definition of R0 applies
to a population with no pre-existing immunity, an assumption that
may be violated for seasonal influenza. One can use the model to
simulate seasonal influenza epidemics by substituting R0 with the
desired R, the average number of people a typical infected case
infects in a population with pre-existing immunity.
The simulated case generation time, or the time between
infection of an individual and the transmission to susceptibles, was
3.4 days for a wide range of R0 in a fully susceptible population
(Figure 2B). This is consistent with other estimates for seasonal and
pandemic influenza [20,23].
Simulated interventions
The primary pharmaceutical intervention is vaccination.
Vaccinated individuals in the simulation have a reduced
Figure 1.The natural history of influenza of simulated individ-
uals in FLuTE. When a susceptible individual is infected (at time t),
that person will be infectious for six days with infectiousness
proportional to his or her viral load. The six possible viral load
trajectories are plotted. Most individuals become symptomatic, which
occurs after a 1, 2, or 3 day incubation period. Symptomatic individuals
are twice as infectious as asymptomatic individuals (i.e., infectiousness
is proportional to twice the viral load). Individuals recover six days after
infection and are immune.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000656.g001
Table 3. Probabilities that an individual will withdraw to the
home 0, 1, or 2 days after becoming symptomatic.
Age group 0 days 1 day 2 days
Preschool-age children 0.304 0.575 0.324
School-age children 0.203 0.498 0.375
Adults 0.100 0.333 0.167
Data from [16].
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000656.t003
Table 4. Estimates of secondary household attack rates from
[17] and illness attack rates using FluTE, stratified by the ages
of the index and secondary cases.
Exposed
Addy 1991 simulated (R0~1:30)
child adult child adult
Infectious child 29.0% 14.2% 28.6% 13.5%
adult 10.3% 15.6% 9.3% 16.2%
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000656.t004
Table 5. Age-specific influenza illness attack rates in past
influenza epidemics (from [46]) and in a simulation of
metropolitan Seattle.
Age group
Asian A
(H2N2)
Hong Kong
A (H3N2) Age group simulated
1957–8 1968–9 (R0~1:6)
Pre-school
children
35% 34% 0–4 years 38%
School-age
children
55% 35% 5–18 years 53%
Young adults 25% 35% 19–29 years 26%
Middle adults 20% 32% 30–64 years 28%
Old adults 14% 31% §65 years 23%
Overall 31% 34% 33%
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000656.t005
Influenza Epidemic Simulation
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infection (VEP), and of transmitting infection (VEI) [24]. In the
model, these efficacy parameters are implemented by multiplying
the transmission probability per time step by (12VES) if the
susceptible individual is vaccinated and by (12VEI) if the
infectious individual is vaccinated. The probability of vaccinated
individuals becoming symptomatic (ill) after they are infected is the
baseline probability (67%) multiplied by (12VEP).
Vaccines do not reach full efficacy immediately – their
protective effects may gradually increase over several weeks. The
default behavior in the model is that the vaccine takes two weeks to
reach maximum efficacy, with the efficacy increasing exponen-
tially starting the day after the vaccination. Because of the delay in
reaching maximum efficacy, it may be necessary to vaccinate the
population early. In the simulation, vaccines can be administered
at least four weeks before the epidemic (i.e., pre-vaccination),
during the epidemic (reactive), or one dose can be administered at
least three weeks before the epidemic and the boost can be
administered reactively (prime-boost).
Antiviral agents (neuraminidase inhibitors) can be used for
treatment of cases and for prophylaxis of susceptibles. A single
course of antiviral agents is enough for 10 days of prophylaxis or 5
days of treatment. In the model, 5% of individuals taking antiviral
agents prophylactically stop after 2 days and 5% taking them for
treatment stop after 1 day [19]. As with vaccines, individuals
taking antiviral agents can have reduced susceptibility (AVES),
probability of becoming ill given infection (AVEP), and transmit-
ting infection (AVEI). However, unlike vaccines, the protective
effects of the antiviral agents last only as long as they are being
taken (5 to 10 days). When a case is ascertained, the individual is
treated with antiviral agents, and that individual’s household
members will also each be given a course if household targeted
antiviral prophylaxis (HHTAP) is in effect.
Several non-pharmaceutical interventions can be simulated in the
model. School closures are simulated by eliminating school group
contacts (including preschools and daycares but not playgroups) for
those enrolled in school, but adding daytime contacts with other
household members not in school or at work and doubling their
daytime neighborhood and community contact probabilities to
account for their non-school activities. Schools can be closed when
cases are ascertained in communities or in the schools, and they can be
closed for a fixed number of days or for the duration of the simulation.
During an epidemic, individuals may be requested to stay at home
if they become ill. When simulating isolation of cases, individuals
withdraw to the home one day after becoming symptomatic (with a
certain probability to represent the compliance probability). This will
eliminate any daytime social contacts that they have other than with
household members who are not working or at school. We simulate a
liberal leave policy in a similar manner: employed individuals withdraw
to the home with a pre-set compliance probability for one week one
day after becoming symptomatic.
During an epidemic, those living with symptomatic individuals
may be requested to stay home [25]. In simulations of household
quarantine, family members of symptomatic individuals will inde-
pendently decide (based on a compliance probability) whether to
obeyquarantinefor7daysonedayafterthe firstindividualbecomes
symptomatic. Individuals electing to quarantine themselves with-
draw to the household and interact only with household members.
If other family members become ill during quarantine, household
members independently decide whether to obey quarantine for 7
days one day after each individual becomes symptomatic.
Implementation of the stochastic model
FluTE is written in C/C++ and is released under the
GNU General Public License (GPLv3, see http://www.gnu.org/
licenses/gpl.html). The source code is available at http://www.
csquid.org/software, https://www.epimodels.org/midas/flute.do,
Table 6. Major sources of influenza transmission in
simulations of metropolitan Seattle.
Mixing group Fraction of transmissions
R0~1:2 R0~1:6 R0~2:0
household 32% 31% 29%
schools/daycares 30% 24% 21%
workplace 10% 13% 15%
neighborhood/
community
18% 21% 23%
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000656.t006
Table 7. Person-to-person contact probabilities for all social mixing groups in FluTE.
Exposed
child 0–4 child 5–18 adult 19–29 adult 30–64 adult 65+
Family, infectious is child 0.8 0.8 0.35 0.35 0.35
Family, infectious is adult 0.25 0.25 0.4 0.4 0.4
Household cluster, infectious is child 0.08 0.08 0.035 0.035 0.035
Household cluster, infectious is adult 0.025 0.025 0.04 0.04 0.04
Neighborhood 0.0000435 0.0001305 0.000348 0.000348 0.000696
Community 0.0000109 0.0000326 0.000087 0.000087 0.000174
Workplace 0.05 0.05
Playgroup 0.28
Daycare 0.12
Elementary school 0.0348
Middle school 0.03
High school 0.0252
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000656.t007
Influenza Epidemic Simulation
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repository [26]. The software includes two source code files that
are also freely distributable but may come with different licenses
because they were written by others: one for the pseudorandom
number generator (SIMD oriented Fast Mersenne Twister
(SFMT) pseudorandom number generator [27]) and one to
generate binomially distributed random numbers (from Numerical
Recipes in C [28]). Version 1.11 of FluTE was used to produce the
results in this manuscript.
A configuration file is used to specify the population to use for
the simulation, the parameters for starting the epidemic, the
transmissibility of the infectious agent, and the desired intervention
strategies. The configuration file is text-based and can be typed in
by a user or generated with a script. The simulation outputs results
to text files, which can be easily parsed for plotting or statistical
analysis.
A parallelized version of the code supports simulations of large
populations (up to the entire continental United States). This
version of the program assigns the populations of different counties
to different processors, and OpenMPI is used to update the status
of individuals who travel between communities that are located on
different processors and to update the global status of the epidemic
and the interventions (e.g., the total number of vaccines used). The
simulation uses approximately 80 megabytes of memory per
million simulated individuals.
The simulation was written with several competing goals: to
explicitly represent each individual in the population, to conserve
memory, to run quickly, and to be (relatively) easy to read and
modify. Each simulated individual is represented by a C structure
that includes unique identifiers for the person and for each of the
social mixing groups to which that person belongs, the age of the
individual, the person’s infection and vaccination status and dates,
and other attributes. For each infected individual, the simulation
identifies all susceptible individuals in that person’s community
who share a common mixing group, the infectiousness of the
infected individual, the susceptibility of the susceptible, and the
probability that transmission takes place for every time step.
Although comparing each individual with every other within a
community results in the number of comparisons increasing with
the square of the number of individuals, community sizes are
always smaller than 3,000 residents. Therefore, the number of
comparisons made between individuals scales approximately
linearly with the number of individuals in the simulation. More
sophisticated algorithms could improve the simulation’s perfor-
mance, but may do so at the expense of the code’s flexibility and
readability.
The running time depends on the number of individuals
infected during the course of a simulation. Simulating an epidemic
in a population of 10 million people can take up to two hours (on a
single processor on an Intel Core2 Duo T9400), but it may take
only seconds if the virus is not highly transmissible (low R0)o ri f
there are effective interventions (e.g., high vaccination rates). On a
cluster of 32 processors, simulating an epidemic covering the
continental United States (population of 280 million) takes about
6 hours (192 hours of total CPU time).
Results
We illustrate the use of the model by simulating epidemics in
metropolitan Seattle, a major metropolitan area with a
population of approximately 560,000 according to the US
2000 Census. We ran simulations with different values of R0,
starting with ten infected individuals chosen at random, and
found that the epidemic could peak as early as 45 days after the
start if R0 is high (R0~2:4) (Figure 3A). Pre-vaccination (with
vaccine efficacies of VES=40%, VEP=67%, VEI=40%, which
correspond to a well-matched seasonal influenza vaccine [29]) is
likely to both lower and delay the epidemic peak (Figure 3B). Use
of antivirals alone (AVES=30%, AVE P=60%, and AVEI=
62% [11]) did not greatly reduce the epidemic peak, but they
could reduce illness and mortality in an epidemic. Non-
pharmaceutical interventions could be quite effective, but the
epidemic may spike immediately upon ending the intervention
(compare permanent school closure with school closure for 60
days in Figure 3B).
The illness attack rates in the simulation are lower than those in
a SIR model with random mixing (where 1{AR~e{R0AR [30],
where AR is the infection attack rate, and the illness attack rate is
0.67|AR) (Figure 3C). As observed in earlier studies, models with
community structure have lower attack rates than those with
random mixing [31–33].
Simulated epidemics struck school-age children earlier than
adults, which had been observed in earlier studies [6,34].
Therefore, we predict that early in an epidemic, the proportion
of cases who are school-age children will be higher than later in
the epidemic (Figure 4). This phenomenon might affect the
accuracy of R0 estimates in unfolding epidemics. For example,
most confirmed cases in the recent novel influenza A(H1N1)
outbreaks in the United States have been school-age children
[35] and several early estimates of R0 have been above 2
[36,37]. In our model, we observed that infected children
generate more secondary cases than infected adults (Figure 2A).
For example, infected school-age children would transmit to an
average of 2:53 other individuals in a simulated epidemic with
R0~1:6.T h e r e f o r e ,e s t i m a t e so fR0 could be high early in an
epidemic when a disproportionate number of infections are in
children.
One can simulate the population of the entire continental US
using the parallel version of FluTE (mpiflute). The continental US
had 280 million people in 64735 census tracts in 2000, based on
the US 2000 Census. In our simulations, we found that the final
illness attack rates for the US to be nearly identical to those of
metropolitan Seattle, but the epidemic peak for a given R0 is later
for the United States (e.g., 94 vs 65 days for R0~1:6)( F i g u r e5 ) .
Therefore, simulations of a sufficiently large metropolitan area
may be adequate for determining the effect of a strategy on the
national level on final illness attack rates, but the nation-wide
peak of the epidemic may be later than in the major metropolitan
areas because of the time it takes the epidemic to reach outlying
areas.
Figure 2. Influenza transmission properties in the simula-
tion. (A) Observed secondary cases vs Ptransby the age of the index
case and the weighted average. (B) Average case generation time vs
R0.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000656.g002
Influenza Epidemic Simulation
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We have described a new publicly available influenza epidemic
simulator, FluTE. It explicitly represents every individual in the
simulation, so simulated epidemics can be studied in detail, even
tracing individual transmission events. We illustrated the use of FluTE
with examples in which we explored the effect of various intervention
strategieson influenza epidemics in the United Statesand showed how
transmissibility can be over-estimated early in an epidemic.
The simulation was written so that one can easily set the
transmissibility, vaccination policies (e.g., fraction of the popula-
tion to vaccinate), and other reactive strategies (e.g., school
closures). These settings can be used to investigate questions such
as: 1) What fraction of the population will become infected or ill?
2) How much vaccine coverage is required to mitigate an epidemic
with a given R0? 3) What segment of the population should be
vaccinated to reduce overall illness attack rates the most? 4) How
long can one wait before reacting to an epidemic? and 5) What
range of R0 can be managed by a particular pandemic strategy?
We have used FluTE to investigate some of these questions by
simulating vaccinating children against seasonal and pandemic
influenza [38] and pandemic mitigation [20].
The model was calibrated to simulate epidemics of a virus
similar to 1957/1958 Asian A(H2N2) and 2009 pandemic
A(H1N1). We attempted to model realistic pharmaceutical and
non-pharmaceutical interventions, but their effects on an
epidemic have not been well quantified. The model’s results are
plausible and likely to be qualitatively correct, but there is
insufficient data to calibrate it to produce quantitatively accurate
results for the various possible disease parameters and mitigation
strategies. Although the model generates realistic population-level
results, the spatial dynamics of the epidemics it produces should
be used for illustrative purposes only. When using the model to
evaluate mitigation strategies, it is important to consider one’s
goals. For example, using antiviral agents to treat cases does not
greatly reduce the final illness attack rate in the simulation, but it
could greatly reduce mortality. The model does not directly
evaluate the cost of interventions, but the numbers of cases in a
simulated epidemic can be linked to cost and healthcare
utilization data [39].
Differential equation models are the most popular approach to
disease modeling. The simplest of these (such as the SIR model
[40]) can be used to study epidemics analytically, and more
complex versions have been used to model the dynamics of
epidemics on a global scale [41,42]. However, if one wants to
include a complicated natural history of disease or detailed
Figure 3. Illness attack rates and daily prevalence of influenza
in simulations of metropolitan Seattle. (A) Daily prevalence of
symptomatic influenza in simulations of metropolitan Seattle for
various R0 and (B) for R0~2:0 with various interventions. The
interventions, which begin 30 days after the first case is detected, are:
giving a course of antiviral agents to ascertained cases, closing schools
either permanently or for 60 days, and pre-vaccination of 50% of the
population with a well-matched seasonal influenza vaccine. (C) Final
illness attack rates (180 days) vs R0 for FluTE (simulating metropolitan
Seattle) and a model with random mixing. Results for all panels are from
one run of metropolitan Seattle for each R0 or intervention strategy
except for the simulation for R0 =1.4 in panel (A), which was run 5
times with different random number seeds and plotted to show
stochastic variability.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000656.g003
Figure 4. The ratio of cumulative illness attack rates between
school-age children (ages 5–18) and adults (ages 19–64) over
time in simulated epidemics. Results plotted are from one
simulation of metropolitan Seattle for each value of R0.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000656.g004
Influenza Epidemic Simulation
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may be more suitable.
The current software supports a limited set of configuration
options and is intended for batch runs using a scripting language.
Using the model for scenarios not supported by the existing code,
such as testing a novel intervention strategy or altering the contact
parameters for a different attack rate pattern, would require
modification of the source code, which we have released so that
others can make such changes if needed. We decided to adopt the
GNU General Public License (GPL), so that the source code of
derivative works must be released. We believe this will facilitate the
sharing of improvements. The availability of source code allows
others to adapt the model to simulate outbreaks of other airborne
infectious diseases such as smallpox [3,43,44] or to simulate other
regions of the world with different social structures [3].
In the future, we would like to make our model more accessible
to non-programmers. This may involve developing a user interface
or adding new parameters to the configuration file. We would also
like to include intervention strategies that best reflect government
pandemic mitigation plans. Achieving these goals would depend
upon close collaboration with public health officials to better
understand their needs and to carefully simulate existing pandemic
mitigation plans and capacities. Although we have calibrated our
model to the best available data, more detailed and reliable
information on the natural history of influenza, influenza
transmission, human behavior in response to infection, and
vaccine efficacy is needed. Sensitivity analyses of similar epidemic
models have shown that results are robust to uncertainty in many
parameters [3,5,6,11]. However, more accurate model inputs
would improve the quantitative predictions. Well-designed studies
are needed to acquire these data.
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